In 5 experiments, we studied precautionary decisions in which participants decided whether or not to buy insurance with specified cost against an undesirable event with specified probability and cost. We compared the risks taken for precautionary decisions with those taken for equivalent monetary gambles. Fitting these data to Tversky and Kahneman's (1992) prospect theory, we found that the weighting function required to model precautionary decisions differed from that required for monetary gambles. This result indicates a failure of the descriptive invariance axiom of expected utility theory. For precautionary decisions, people overweighted small, medium-sized, and moderately large probabilitiesthey exaggerated risks. This effect is not anticipated by prospect theory or experience-based decision research (Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2004) . We found evidence that exaggerated risk is caused by the accessibility of events in memory: The weighting function varies as a function of the accessibility of events. This suggests that people's experiences of events leak into decisions even when risk information is explicitly provided. Our findings highlight a need to investigate how variation in decision content produces variation in preferences for risk.
A virtue of good theory is that it is general; theories that predict a wide range of events have obvious merit. Several prominent theories of decision making achieve this objective by proposing that all decisions can be modeled with the same generic representation. So it is that the leading normative (e.g., von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947) and descriptive psychological theories (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) of decision making share a common representational assumption: People's risk preferences and decisions under risk and uncertainty are task independent. For example, these theories assume that all decisions under risk or uncertainty can be represented as gambles with monetary amounts representing the outcomes. Although the nature of the content area being contemplated (e.g., decisions about health or money or jobs) may influence judgments of the degree of risk and benefit (cf. Slovic, 1987) , most prominent decision theories assume that, once the basic input values for likelihoods and costs are determined, decision making with risky prospects is not influenced by any factors associated with this content and is independent of the decision task. For example, the decision about whether to insure luggage worth £500 for a cost of £5 where the risk of loss is 1% is identical to the decision to pay £5 or take a gamble where there is a 1% chance of losing £500.
Here, we investigate the validity of this assumption by studying the factors that affect people's reactions to presented probabilities in described real-world decision prospects. Research using choices between gambles to study people's decisions under risk implies that decision makers weight the probability of risky events in characteristic ways that deviate from normative expected utility theory (axiomatized by von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947) . Specifically, when making risky decisions, people overweight small probabilities and underweight moderate and large probabilities; breaching rational agents' rules, people's decisions weight probabilities nonlinearly (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992 ; see also Abdellaoui, 2000; Gonzalez & Wu, 1999; Prelec, 1998; Tversky & Wakker, 1995; Wakker, 2003) .
The nonlinear impact of probability on decisions is exemplified by the fourfold pattern of risk preferences predicted by cumulative prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) . Thus, because people overweight small probabilities, both low probability gains and low probability losses loom large relative to certain payoffs with the same expected value. This results in risk seeking for gains and risk aversion for losses at low probability-for example, people are tempted to buy lottery tickets (seeking unlikely gains) and insurance (attempting to avoid unlikely losses). Also, as people underweight moderate and large probabilities, they show a contrasting risk aversion for high-probability gains and risk seeking for high-probability losses compared to certain payoffs with the same expected value. Tversky and Kahneman's (1992) studies reporting under-and overweighting of probability measured respondents' binary choices between monetary gambles. However, there is some reason to believe that people's choices about monetary gambles may not correspond with their preponderance for risk in situations where they need to consider decisions regarding other kinds of risks. Several studies have reported increased attractiveness of decision prospects when framed as insurance decisions; specifically, there is evidence for a context effect in which prospects presented in an insurance context are judged with greater risk aversion than mathematically identical choices presented as standard gambles (Connor, 1996; Hershey & Schoemaker, 1980; Schoemaker & Kunreuther, 1979; Slovic, Fischhoff, Lichtenstein, Corrigan, & Combs, 1977) . This finding has prompted the suggestion that people have a relatively favorable attitude toward insurance because, unlike gambling, insurance is viewed as an investment as well as a means of risk reduction (Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1987) .
Risky Decision Making and Precautions
Given the suggestion that there may be differences in people's decision behavior as a function of the type of risks they may be contemplating, we propose that there is a need to be sensitive to possibly different psychological types of risky decision. Accordingly, we identify and define precautionary decisions and behavior as those occasions where people aim to minimize or avoid risks by taking protective actions and where the benefits of taking precautions exemplify risk-averse behavior (Baron, Hershey, & Kunreuther, 2000; Hershey & Schoemaker, 1980) . Protective behavior and decisions in the face of risk have been the subject of a number of studies (e.g., Baron et al., 2000; Huber & Huber, 2008; Johnson, Hershey, Meszaros, & Kunreuther, 1993; Kunreuther, 2001; Slovic et al., 1987; Wakker, Thaler, & Tversky, 1997 ); yet, to our knowledge, no study has attempted to asses the probabilityweighting function for precautionary decisions in the same way as has been done for choices with monetary gambles.
In this article, we present evidence for a dissimilarity between the pattern of risk preferences with precautionary decisions and risk preferences with monetary gambles indicating that the process of decision making in the two cases may be very different. Apart from the empirical evidence, there are a priori strong reasons to expect that there might be differences in the way people evaluate a choice between two monetary gambles and the way that they might consider adopting precautions against risks, such as whether to buy earthquake insurance. Although a choice between monetary gambles may present a real dilemma, the gambles themselves typically do not have any features that have any meaning for the decision maker-other than their essential structural properties (probability of winning/losing and amount to win/lose). By contrast, hazards that one might insure against have all sorts of other aspects associated with them other than the probability of winning/ losing and the amount to win/lose. Decisions associated with insurance and gambling can be seen as qualitatively different from each other. For example, for insurance decisions-but not for monetary gambles-factors such as individual experience of realworld frequency (e.g., decisions made by analogy to previously encountered problems; Gilboa & Schmeidler, 2001; Stewart, Chater, & Brown, 2006) , accessibility to particular information in memory (Koriat, 1993 (Koriat, , 1995 Tulving & Pearlstone, 1966) , and past subjective experience with anxiety or fear (Kunreuther, 2001; Viscusi & Chesson, 1999) arguably all result in support for precautionary action. Relevant to our concerns here, we suggest that the accessibility of information influences the decision to purchase or not purchase a particular insurance product. We see no evidence that the same factor applies to decisions about monetary gambles. The issue is of considerable importance because, to the extent that decisions made with monetary gambles differ from those made for insurance, the goal of studying monetary (gamble) decisions as a basis for explaining all varieties of human decisions is called into question.
Experiment 1
We assume that, because they are relatively abstract, monetarygamble tasks do not prompt the same history of experience and range of associations as typical real-world protective tasks (e.g., precautionary decisions). For instance, according to the normative theory, a set of simple binary gamble choices of the form "p chance of x, otherwise y" should evoke the same preference order across different decision domains. Accordingly, a 1% chance of losing £300 or a sure loss of £60 and a 1% chance of an insurable event of losing £300 or paying £60 for insurance are equivalent prospects. However, we believe that there are grounds to suspect that behavior in monetary-gamble situations may not correspond with precautionary risk behavior. In particular, we suspect that people might be more risk averse when contemplating the probabilities and losses associated with options in precautionary decision making. Accordingly, Experiment 1 was designed to compare the pattern of people's risk preferences in protective (insurance) decision making with the pattern exhibited for monetary gambles and also to see if insurance decision making can be modeled within the classic framework of Tversky and Kahneman's prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and cumulative prospect theory (Tversky & Fox, 1995; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) .
Method
Participants. Participants were 60 students (33 female, 27 male) from the University of Warwick, Coventry, England. Mean age was 21 (SD ϭ 2.43). Participants took part individually and received a payment of £5.
Stimuli and equipment. An interactive computer program for binary decision making was used. Four types of binary decisionmaking situations (scenarios), each corresponding with one of four experimental conditions, were included: gamble gain (monetary gamble with a sure gain vs. a gain with a given probability), gamble loss (monetary gamble with a sure loss vs. a loss with a given probability), insurance gain (a sure rebate-i.e., a refund on an insurance premium-vs. a rebate with a given probability), and insurance loss (insurance against loss of luggage vs. a loss of luggage with a given probability).
In a first session, participants had to indicate a preference between a probabilistic outcome and a sure outcome in a series of 308 trials. The trials were created by combining four monetary amounts (£50, £100, £200, £400) for the probabilistic outcomes with 11 probabilities (.01, .05, .10, .25, .40, .50, .60, .75, .90, .95, .99) , and each of these combinations was presented with one of seven monetary amounts for the sure outcome (logarithmically spaced between £1 and the amount of the probabilistic outcome), producing 4 ϫ 11 ϫ 7 ϭ 308 combinations. We used a method similar to that used by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) to present binary-choice prospects (a choice between a probabilistic and a sure outcome). The following algorithm was used for each participant: First, randomly select one of the four monetary amounts. Second, for this monetary amount, randomly select a probability level. Third, randomly present each of the seven sure monetary amounts. Fourth, go back to the second step unless all probability levels have been sampled, in which case go back to the first step and repeat until all prospects have been presented.
As in Tversky and Kahneman (1992) , participants' certainty equivalent (CE) estimates were based on the sure outcomes chosen in the task: the midpoint between the lowest accepted value and the highest rejected value in the prospects. To obtain a more refined estimate of the CE, in a second session, values of people's preferences were linearly spaced between a value 25% higher than the lowest amount accepted in the first set (session) and a value 25% lower than the highest amount rejected. The CE of a prospect was estimated as the midpoint between the lowest accepted value of the sure outcome and the highest rejected value in the second set of choices.
Design and procedure. Previous research (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992 ) used a repeated measures design with loss and gain scenarios mixed in a single series (simultaneous within-subject design; Keppel, 1991) . Results obtained under these conditions could be an artifact of the design. Specifically, a contrast effect may result (Keppel, 1991) ; that is, either an effect becomes more pronounced compared to an independent measures design, or a spurious effect could occur, which would not occur with an independent measures design. To avoid this pitfall, we used a 2 ϫ 2 between-subjects design, with the following independent variables: decision-making task (gamble, insurance) and decisionmaking domain (gain, loss). There were 15 participants in each experimental condition.
At the start of the program, task instructions and then an example scenario with illustrative choices were presented. On each trial, participants were asked to consider a presented scenario and choose one of two options. For example, Insurance-loss scenario: (a) 1% chance of losing your luggage, which is worth £400, or (b) buying insurance at a cost of £20 to insure against the loss of your luggage.
Gamble-loss scenario: (a) 1% chance of losing £400 or (b) a sure loss of £20.
Insurance-gain scenario: (a) 1% chance of winning an insurance rebate of £400 or (b) a guaranteed insurance rebate of £20.
Gamble-gain scenario: (a) 1% chance of winning £400 or (b) a sure gain of £20.
Participants completed a series of 308 trials of binary decisions with one of the four types of scenario within each of two sessions.
Results and Discussion
The results are organized as follows: First, we present an analysis of the risk preferences of the respondents. Second, we present analysis of the CE measures, and, third, we present the result of our attempts to fit the observed decisions to the prospect theory probability-weighting function. All statistical tests reported in this article used a significance level of .05 unless indicated otherwise.
Risk preference. In both the insurance-gain and gamble-gain scenarios, rates of risk-seeking choices (where CE exceeds expected value) decreased from about 80% to about 10% as the probability of the risky prospect increased (see Table 1 and Figure 1 ). All participants in the gain conditions were predominantly risk averse. A two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) confirmed this result for gain scenarios, with a significant effect of probability range (.01, Յ.1 and Ն.5) on risk preference, F(2, 56) ϭ 149.39, p Ͻ .001, very large effect size (ε 2 ϭ .77). However, the effect of task (gamble, insurance) and the Range ϫ Task interaction effect were not significant (both Fs Ͻ 1). In the insurance-loss condition, there were fewer risk-seeking choices-ranging from 0% to 40%-across the different probabilities of prospects compared to the gamble-loss conditionwhere the proportion of risk-seeking choices ranged from 10% to 83% (see Table 2 and Figure 1 ).
In the two loss scenarios, rates of risk-averse choices decreased with increasing probability of risky prospects, but more so for the gamble-loss scenario-from 90% to 17%-than for the insuranceloss scenario-from 100% to 60% (see Table 2 and Figure 1 ). A two-way ANOVA confirmed this result; there were significant effects on risk preference of both main effects of range, F(2, 56) ϭ 82.12, p Ͻ .001, very large effect size (ε 2 ϭ .62); and task, F(1, 28) ϭ 24.39, p Ͻ .001, medium effect size (ε 2 ϭ .05); as well as an interaction effect, F(2, 56) ϭ 6.60, p Ͻ .001, medium effect size (ε 2 ϭ .05), significant. Simple effect tests showed that the effect of range was significant for the gamble scenario, F(2, 56) ϭ 91.74, p Ͻ .001, very large effect size (ε 2 ϭ .82), and for the insurance scenario, F(2, 56) ϭ 15.73, p Ͻ .001, very large effect size (ε 2 ϭ .48). CE. The average CE estimation was based on respondents' decisions between sure outcomes and probabilistic outcomes. Seven sure outcomes logarithmically spaced between 1 and the amount of the probabilistic outcome (£50, £100, £200, £400), each presented with 11 probabilities (.01, .05, .10, .25, .40, .50, .60, .75, .90, .95, .99) , were paired with one probabilistic outcome (£50, £100, £200, or £400). For the gain scenarios, a trend of increasing CE with amount is discernible in Figure 2 . In addition, CE is substantially higher for the insurance-loss condition (about 0.6) than for the other three conditions (less than 0.4). These observations were confirmed by the results of statistical tests. A 2 ϫ 2 ϫ 4 ANOVA with independent variables task (insurance, gamble), type of decision domain (loss, gain), and probabilistic amount (£50, £100, £200, £400), showed that the following main and interaction effects were significant: task, F(1, 56) ϭ 12.46, medium effect size (ε 2 ϭ .05), p Ͻ .001; domain, F(1, 56) ϭ 23.20, medium-to-large effect size (ε 2 ϭ .10), p Ͻ .001; probabilistic amount, F(3, 168) ϭ 6.04, small-to-medium effect size (ε 2 ϭ .04), p Ͻ .001; Task ϫ Domain interaction, F(1, 56) ϭ 12.11, medium effect size (ε 2 ϭ .05), p Ͻ .001; Amount ϫ Domain interaction, F(3, 168) ϭ 2.64, small effect size (ε 2 ϭ .02), p ϭ .05; and Amount ϫ Task ϫ Domain interaction, F(3, 168) ϭ 3.64, smallto-medium effect size (ε 2 ϭ .03, p Ͻ .05; see also Figure 2 ). The Amount ϫ Task interaction effect (F Ͻ 1) was not significant. The three-way interaction precluded interpretation of main effects and two-way interactions; therefore, 2 ϫ 2 ANOVAs with the independent variables task (insurance, gamble) and decision domain (loss, gain) were conducted as simple effect tests for each probabilistic amount (£50, £100, £200, £400). The effects of task and domain and the interaction effect were large and significant, with the largest effect size for the smallest probabilistic amount and the smallest effect size for the largest probabilistic amount (see Table 3 and Figure 2 ). These results demonstrate relatively high CE in the insurance-loss condition, consistent with the notion that people are particularly risk averse for insurance losses.
The CE analysis mirrors the analysis of people's risk preferences: more risk-averse precautionary decisions than gambling decisions and higher precautionary CE than gambling CE. These results provide evidence for a greater propensity for precautionary action with insurance risks than would be inferred from responses to equivalent monetary gambles-what we term a protective effect. Probability-weighting function. Numerous studies investigating preferences for monetary prospects (e.g., Camerer & Ho, 1994; Fox & Tversky, 1998; Gonzalez & Wu, 1999; Tversky & Fox, 1995; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) have reported evidence in favor of overweighting of small probabilities and underweighting of moderate and large probabilities-resulting in an inverse S-shaped probability-weighting function. However, there is reason to believe that people's risky decisions across different sorts of decisions are not consistent. For instance, a person may prefer to bet on sporting events rather than on the outcomes of political elections, even when the chance of winning is held constant (Heath & Tversky, 1991) .
With a nonlinear regression procedure, judged probabilities were modeled with a variation (with no constant parameters) of Gonzalez and Wu's (1999) two-parameter probability-weighting function,
and a power utility function with one free parameter of the form
In the two-parameter probability-weighting function, represents the decision weight given to probability p, where ␤ represents probability discriminability (curvature of the function) and ␦ represents attractiveness (elevation of the function).
Probability-weighting functions were fitted for each participant in all four experimental conditions, replicating the method adopted by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) . As indicated earlier, respondents' CEs were inferred from their choices between sure outcomes and probabilistic outcomes, each presented at various levels of probability. In the modeling procedure, we express the actual CEs as a function of probability, amount, and the model parameters. As in previous research (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) , for the gamble-gain, gamble-loss, and insurance-gain scenarios, small probabilities were overweighted and medium-sized and large probabilities were underweighted. This was confirmed by the model's estimations of the probability-weighting function (see Figures 3a, 3b, and 3c) . However, for the insurance-loss scenario, small, medium-sized, and moderately large probabilities were overweighted, and large probabilities were slightly underweighted (see Figure 3d ).
We fitted the functions for each participant and then analyzed the effect of the independent variables on the model parameters and the error-in each case, minimizing the summed squared error between actual CEs and predicted CEs. Mean values (SD) of model parameters were less than 1 for probability discriminability (␤): gamble gain: 0.60 (0.24); gamble loss: 0.72 (0.28); insurance gain: 0.63 (0.13). Mean values of parameters were less than 1 for attractiveness (␦): gamble gain: 0.49 (0.35); gamble loss: 0.79 (0.46); insurance gain: 0.63 (0.26). Parameter values were (almost) equal to 1 for the utility function parameter ␣: gamble gain: 1.02 (0.06); gamble loss: 1.03 (0.13); insurance gain: 1.00 (0.03). By contrast, for insurance losses, mean values (SD) for ␤, ␦, and ␣ were 0.69 (0.23), 1.60 (0.64) and 1.00 (0.02), respectively, and the model reproduced the relationship between actual and weighted probabilities shown in Figure 3d .
A two-way ANOVA showed no significant effect of task (insurance, gamble), type of decision domain (loss, gain), and their interaction on error, on the utility function parameter ␣, or on probability discriminability (␤). However, there were significant effects of task, F(1, 56) ϭ 16.34, large effect size (ε 2 ϭ .14), p Ͻ .001; domain, F(1, 56) ϭ 28.56, very large effect size (ε 2 ϭ .25), p Ͻ .001; and an interaction effect, F(1, 56) ϭ 8.11, medium effect size (ε 2 ϭ .07), p Ͻ .01, on attractiveness (␦). Multiplecomparison tests with Bonferroni correction demonstrated that in the domain of loss, the effect of task on attractiveness (␦) was significant, t(28) ϭ 3.94, large effect size (r ϭ .60), p Ͻ .001, but in the domain of gain, the effect of task was not significant, t(28) ϭ 1.24, p Ͼ .05. Furthermore, planned comparison tests with Bonferroni correction showed that attractiveness (␦) for the insurance-loss condition was significantly different from that for each of the other three conditions, all ts(56) ϭ 7.06, large effect size (r ϭ .59), p Ͻ .001. The finding of a greater value for attractiveness in the insurance-loss condition indicates that respondents overweighted small and medium probabilities to a greater extent in that condition and is consistent with the notion that respondents showed a protective effect for precautionary decisions.
Our results demonstrate that the independent variables task and domain did not affect the error of the model in predicting CE, the utility function parameter ␣, or probability discriminability (␤). Best fitting utility functions were approximately linear in each condition, with ␣ Ϸ 1. Thus, the observed differences across conditions in the probability-weighting function are not compensated by any corresponding changes in the utility function across conditions.
The results of Experiment 1 demonstrated a different pattern of over-and underweighting of probabilities in the insurance-loss condition compared to the other conditions. A protective effectexaggerated probability weights for insurance-loss decisions-was observed. Existing normative and descriptive theories cannot account for the phenomenon found in Experiment 1, which can be modeled as a function of two psychologically autonomous properties of the probability-weighting function (cf. Gonzalez & Wu, 1999) : ␤ (the curvature) signifying probability discriminability and ␦ (attractiveness; the elevation). This finding suggests a need for models that differentiate between precautionary behavior and other types of decision making under risk and uncertainty. Cumulative prospect theory predicts a fourfold pattern of risk preferences (see Table 4 ) across gain and loss scenarios: People are predominantly risk seeking for low-probability gains and high-probability losses and are predominantly risk averse for high-probability gains and low-probability losses. However, protective decision making with described real-world prospects, as represented in Figure 3d , highly overweights small, moderate, and even large probabilities and underweights only the most extreme high-probability options, in contrast to the function we (and Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) observed for gambles and that is responsible for the fourfold pattern of risk preferences. All of Tversky and Kahneman's (1992) participants (25) were predominantly risk averse for gains and risk seeking for losses (see Table 4 ); we replicated this observation in respondents contemplating monetary gambles (see Tables 1 and 2 ). In contrast, our insurance respondents, although predominantly risk averse for gains (see Table 1 ), were also predominantly risk averse for losses (see Table 2 ). As we noted earlier, prominent decision theories-although differing in their approach-assume that all decisions can be represented as gambles with monetary amounts representing the outcomes. The present findings suggest that, counter to this assumption, decision making with risky prospects is influenced by the nature of the issue being decided and is not independent of the decision task.
Experiment 2
The protective effect (exaggerated probability weights) found in Experiment 1, if confirmed, creates difficulties for current descriptive theories of decision making. This is why it is important to demonstrate the stability of the risk preferences found in Experiment 1. Accordingly, in Experiment 2, we sought to replicate the effect with the same participants, but after allowing time for their memory of the specific trials of the experiment to decay (in Experiment 3, we again sought to replicate the effect with a different sample of respondents).
In Experiment 2, the stability over time of the protective effect (exaggerated probability weights) found in Experiment 1 was assessed. This experiment further explored people's precautionary preferences and the significance of the probability function's overweighting for protective loss, following Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and Tversky and Fox's (1995) theoretical framework.
Method
Ninety days after Experiment 1, the same 15 participants who were in the insurance-loss condition in Experiment 1 again took part in the same experimental condition for a payment of £5. Materials and apparatus were the same as in Experiment 1.
Results and Discussion
We fitted the two-parameter probability-weighting function for each participant, as in the previous experiment. Mean (SD) values were 0.67 (0.23) for probability discriminability (␤), 1.43 (0.77) for attractiveness (␦), and 1.00 (0.03) for the utility function parameter ␣. The model produced the relationship between actual and weighted probabilities shown in Figure 3e ; as can be seen, the shape of the function is very similar to that observed for insurance losses in Experiment 1 (cf. Figure 3d ). In terms of the twoparameter model, decision making was consistent within participants from Experiment 1 to Experiment 2, with intraclass correlations (ICC) of .71 for ␤, F(14, 14) ϭ 3.56, p ϭ .001, and .87 for ␦, F(14, 14) ϭ 14.31, p Ͻ .001. 1
The pattern of risk-seeking preferences-proportions of total (SD) ϭ .00 (.00), .11 (.21), and .46 (.29), for p ϭ .01, .01 Ͻ p Յ .1, and p Ն .5, respectively-was very similar to that in the insurance-loss condition in Experiment 1 (see Figure 1 ). This pattern was identical for the probability of .01 and consistent for probabilities .01 Ͻ p Յ .10, ICC ϭ .47, F(14, 14) ϭ 2.77, p Ͻ .05, and for probabilities Ն.50, ICC ϭ .91, F(14, 14) ϭ 20.26, p Ͻ .001. In conclusion, the stability of the protective effect identified in Experiment 1 was confirmed in Experiment 2.
Experiment 3
The protective effect found in Experiment 1 proved to be stable over time (Experiment 2). Experiment 3 investigated the generalizability of this effect under different circumstances: (a) a different type of protective (insurance) scenario (home insurance) was used; (b) a different monetary amount for the sure outcome was used; accordingly, (c) a different set of monetary amounts for the probabilistic outcome was used; (d) furthermore, participants took part in only one session.
Method
Participants. Participants were 128 students (99 female, 29 male) from Teesside University, Middlesbrough, England, who took part individually as part of their course requirement. Their mean age was 22 (SD ϭ 6.49).
Stimuli and equipment. An interactive computer program for binary decision making was used. Four types of binary decisionmaking situations (scenarios), each corresponding with one of four experimental conditions, were included: gamble gain (monetary gamble with a sure gain vs. a gain with a given probability; n ϭ 33), gamble loss (monetary gamble with a sure loss vs. a loss with a given probability; n ϭ 34), insurance gain (a sure rebate on an insurance premium vs. a rebate with a given probability; n ϭ 30) and insurance loss (insurance against burglary vs. loss of belongings as a result of burglary with a given probability; n ϭ 31).
Participants were required to indicate a preference between a probabilistic outcome and a sure outcome in a series of 231 trials. Using a method similar to that used by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) , we created the trials by combining 1 monetary amount for the probabilistic outcome (£600) with each of 11 probabilities (.01, .05, .10, .25, .40, .50, .60, .75, .90, .95, .99) , and each of these combinations was presented with 1 of 21 monetary amounts representing the sure outcomes (linearly spaced between £1 and £600), producing 1 ϫ 11 ϫ 21 ϭ 231. The 231 decisions were presented in random order. The CE of a prospect was estimated as the midpoint between the lowest accepted value and the highest rejected value.
Design and procedure. A 2 ϫ 2 between-subjects design was used, with independent variables task (gamble, insurance) and domain (gain, loss). At the start of the session, task instructions and then an example scenario with illustrative choices were pre-1 The intraclass correlation coefficient is a measure of similarity that takes into account both profile shape and profile elevation (Lorr, 1983) and expresses the between-subjects variability relative to other sources of variability (Howell, 1997) . Table 4 Percentage of Risk Preferences (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) Risk preference
Gamble gain (%)
Gamble loss (%)
Risk seeking 78 10 20 87 Risk averse 10 88 80 6
Note. Values that correspond to the fourfold pattern (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) . Percentages are mean values.
sented. On each trial, participants were asked to consider a presented scenario and choose one of two options, for example, Insurance-loss scenario: (a) a 10% chance of losing your belongings, which are worth £600, or (b) buying insurance at a cost of £90 to insure against the loss of your belongings.
Participants completed a series of 231 trials of binary decisions with one of the four types of scenario.
Results and Discussion
Risk preference. In both loss scenarios, rates of risk-seeking choices increased as the probability of the risky prospect increased (see Table 5 and Figure 4 ), but with more risk seeking in the gamble-loss scenario-ranging from 35% to 92%-than in the insurance-loss scenario-ranging from 10% to 46%-confirming the pattern of risk preferences found in Experiments 1 and 2. A two-way ANOVA investigating the effects of domain (gain, loss) and probability of risky prospect on risk preferences confirmed this result for the loss scenarios, with significant effects of probability (.01, Յ.1 and Ն.5), F(2, 126) ϭ 39.30, p Ͻ .001, large effect size (ε 2 ϭ .20), and task (gamble, insurance), F(1, 63) ϭ 39.96, p Ͻ .001, large effect size (ε 2 ϭ .17), but the Probability ϫ Task interaction effect was not significant, F(2, 126) ϭ 1.80, p Ͼ .05. In the gain scenarios, risk seeking decreased with probability, and gamble and insurance scenarios did not seem to differ (see Figure 4 ). A further two-way ANOVA investigating the effects of domain (gain, loss) and probability of risky prospect on risk preferences for the gain scenarios showed a significant effect of probability (.01, Յ.1 and Ն.5), F(2, 122) ϭ 189.66, p Ͻ .001, very large effect size (ε 2 ϭ .58), but the effect of task (gamble, insurance), F(1, 61) ϭ 2.01, p ϭ .16, and the Probability ϫ Task interaction effect (F Ͻ 1) were not significant.
CE. The average CE estimation was based on 21 sure outcomes, each presented together with 11 probabilistic outcomes. As in Experiment 1, the average CE was higher for the insurance-loss scenario (above 0.5) than for the other scenarios (below 0.4; see Figure 5 ). A 2 ϫ 2 ANOVA with the independent variables task (insurance, gamble) and domain (loss, gain) showed that the main effects of domain, F(1, 124) ϭ 68.28, very large effect size (ε 2 ϭ .29), p Ͻ .001, and of task, F(1, 124) ϭ 26.95, large effect size (ε 2 ϭ .11), p Ͻ .001, as well as the interaction effect, F(1, 124) ϭ 15.76, medium effect size (ε 2 ϭ .06), p Ͻ .001, were significant (see also Figure 5 ). Simple effect tests with Bonferroni correction showed that the effect of domain was significant both in the gamble task, t(65) ϭ 3.07, medium effect size (r ϭ .36), p Ͻ .01, and in the insurance task, t(59) ϭ 8.59, very large effect size (r ϭ .75), p Ͻ .001. The difference between the effect sizes was significant as well (z ϭ 3.26, p Ͻ .001). Further simple effect tests with Bonferroni correction showed that the effect of task was significant in the domain of losses, t(63) ϭ 6.77, large effect size (r ϭ .65), p Ͻ .001, but not in the domain of gains (t Ͻ 1, r ϭ .11). The difference between the effect sizes was significant (z ϭ 3.69, p Ͻ .001). These results demonstrate higher CE judgments for the prospects within the insurance-loss condition, in agreement with the results of risk preferences found in Experiments 1 and 2.
Probability-weighting function. Judged probabilities in the insurance-loss scenario were modeled as in Experiment 1. The results from Experiment 3 confirmed our basic finding that with precautionary decisions, people exaggerate risk. There were differences in the shape of the probability-weighting function in the different tasks (gambles and precautionary decisions); specifically, probability weights were exaggerated in precautionary decisions in the domain of loss ( Figure 6 ).
We fitted the function for all participants (see Figures 6a, 6b, and 6c), minimizing the summed squared error between actual CEs and predicted CEs of all participants, and values of model parameters were less than 1 for probability discriminability, or ␤ (gamble gain: 0.48; gamble loss: 0.67; insurance gain: 0.56), less than 1 for attractiveness, or ␦ (gamble gain: 0.37; gamble loss: 0.98; insurance gain: 0.45), and (almost) equal to 1 for the utility function parameter ␣ (gamble gain: 0.98; gamble loss: 0.95; insurance gain: 0.98). In the insurance-loss scenario, small, medium-sized, and moderately large probabilities were overweighted, and large prob- abilities were slightly underweighted; values for ␤, ␦, and ␣ were 0.55, 1.86, and 0.99, respectively. One possible reason for the difference between gambles and precautionary decisions in the domain of loss is that, for precautionary decisions, experienced real-world risk frequencies are likely to influence decision making about described recognizable prospects. We hypothesize that the probability-weighting function is affected by the accessibility of real-world events-instances of some described real-world precautionary prospects may be more accessible in our memory than any (less likely) corresponding traces that may exist for monetary gambles.
As in previous research, participants in the gamble-gain and insurance-gain conditions overweighted very small probabilities and underweighted medium-sized and large probabilities (see Figures 6a and 6c) . Similarly, in the gamble-loss condition small to medium-sized probabilities were overweighted, and the remaining probabilities were underweighted. However, in the insurance-loss condition, small to medium-sized probabilities were massively overweighted, medium-sized to high probabilities were somewhat overweighted, and only very high probabilities were underweighted (see Figures 6b and 6d) . The results of Experiment 3 confirmed the distinctiveness of people's precautionary decisions, in particular a different pattern of over-and underweighting of probabilities compared to the gamble condition. Participants exaggerated (overweighted) the described protective risk and demonstrated a lack of risk-seeking preferences in protective decision making compared to the monetary (gamble) condition, where risk-seeking preferences predominated (see Table 5 ).
Experiment 4
As discussed earlier, prior research has reported increased attractiveness of risk-averse options when presented in the context of insurance decisions (Hershey & Schoemaker, 1980; Schoemaker & Kunreuther, 1979; Slovic et al., 1977) . When evaluating risks for insurance, people do not usually use statistical evidence about the probability of risky events. Instead, people may commonly rely on inferences based on what they remember hearing or observing about a particular risk (Hertwig, Pachur, & Kurzenhäuser, 2005; Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) . According to the accessibility framework (Kahneman, 2003; Koriat, 1993 Koriat, , 1995 Tulving & Pearlstone, 1966) , people's judgments are based on the amount and intensity of the information accessed in the course of a particular task. Many instances of insurable events are encountered in everyday life more frequently than others, not only from personal experience, but also through TV, newspapers, advertisements, and conversations. Reliance on such sources may have some validity (cf. Hertwig et al., 2005) but may induce erroneous feelings that some sorts of risk are more frequent than others (e.g., Lichtenstein, Slovic, Fischhoff, Layman, & Combs, 1978) . For instance, the familiarity bias reported by Fox and Levav (2000) showed that people typically judged more familiar events to be more probable than less familiar events, more often than they judged the complement of the same less familiar events to be more probable than the complement of the more familiar events. Thus, when business students in a master's program were asked to judge the comparative future performance of two investment funds, the proportion who judged that a familiar fund was more likely than an unfamiliar fund to perform well was greater than the proportion who judged that the unfamiliar fund was more likely than the familiar fund to perform poorly. Such results are assumed to occur partly because it is easier to recruit evidence supporting familiar events than unfamiliar events. Accordingly, we hypothesized that more accessible events (e.g., high-frequency events) would be viewed with an increased perceived likelihood, whereas less accessible events (e.g., lowfrequency events and monetary gambles) would not be.
In their studies, Koriat (1995) and Koriat and Levy-Sadot (2001) rated the accessibility of questions as high or low on the basis of the percentage of participants who provided an answer to each question regardless of whether the answers were correct or incorrect. We adapted this method for the present study in which participants were asked first to recall any instances of the defined events and then to rate their frequency (high-or low-frequency risks). We defined the accessibility of events in memory in terms of these subjective ratings of their frequency (high-or lowfrequency risks). We then investigated whether the influence of accessibility would be strong enough to have a measurable impact on the risky decisions that respondents made in the decisionmaking phase of the experiment. Accordingly, Experiment 4 examined the hypothesis that accessibility (measured by rated frequency) would affect choice and risk preferences for risky decisions when we explicitly supplied-and independently varied-the precise probability of the risk. In particular, we predicted greater risk-averse behavior for more accessible risks. We also hypothesized that the CEs inferable from people's insurance decisions would reflect an apparent exaggeration of the supplied probability for judged high-frequency risks compared to lowfrequency risks. Given our argument that monetary gambles provide few accessible features, risk aversion for monetary gambles should be less than or, at most, at the same level as for the judged low-frequency risks.
To meet a possible criticism of the earlier experiments-that they involved respondents repeatedly evaluating the same risky scenario (albeit with varying probabilities and amounts of loss)- Experiment 4 presents a wide range of different risky scenarios to each respondent. All decisions required respondents to consider the risk of loss.
Method
Development of materials. A norming procedure was designed to produce two sets of risks and to allow the selection of high-and low-frequency risks to be used in Experiment 4. Eighty-four City University London undergraduate and postgraduate students (52 female, 32 male) were recruited for a brief norming procedure. The participants were paid £3 and took part individually. Mean age was 19.17 (SD ϭ 2.26). On the basis of our intuitive judgments, 24 risks with similar actuarial low probability were presented: 12 presumed to be perceived as low-frequency risks and 12 presumed to be perceived as high-frequency risks were included. Respondents rated each risk according to its frequency (participants were asked to refer to any instances of each risk that came to mind from any source of information) on a 10-point Likert scale ranging from not frequent to very frequent. To help respondents to focus on frequency independent of riskiness, respondents also rated the riskiness of these risks on a 10-point Likert scale from not risky to very risky. Participants were encouraged to use the full range of the scale (see the Appendix).
At the start of the procedure, task instructions and then all 24 risks were presented before any of the ratings were elicited. Participants first had to judge the frequency of each of the presented risks and then-in a separate series-their riskiness.
Our intuitions were broadly confirmed; those items we selected as high frequency were rated significantly higher than those selected to represent low frequency. As expected, the estimated frequency of the average risks rated as high frequency, M ϭ 6.09, CI .95 (mean) ϭ [5.83, 6.35], SD ϭ 1.19, was higher than that of the average risks rated as low frequency, M ϭ 4.27, CI .95 (mean) ϭ [4.03, 4.50], SD ϭ 1.08; t(83) ϭ 14.16, p Ͻ .001, r ϭ .84, with high-frequency risks estimated 43% higher than low-frequency risks. The estimated frequency of risks correlated with the perceived riskiness of risks, r ϭ .64, p Ͻ .001. The nine risks with the highest estimated frequency and the nine risks with the lowest estimated frequency were selected for inclusion in Experiment 4 (see the Appendix). Across respondents, the mean judged frequency of the high-frequency risks was always greater than 5, whereas the mean judged frequency of the low-frequency risks was always less than 5.
Participants. We recruited 90 City University London undergraduate and postgraduate students (36 male and 54 female) for a decision-making experiment. They were paid £5 and took part individually. Mean age was 19.17 (SD ϭ 2.26). Stimuli and equipment. As before, a computer-based experiment for binary decision making was used. On the basis of the results from the norming procedure, we constructed three types of binary decision-making situations (scenarios), each corresponding with one of three experimental conditions: high-frequency risk (insurance against risks with a given probability that received a high estimated frequency in the norming procedure), lowfrequency risk (insurance against risks with a given probability that received a low estimated frequency), and monetary-gamble risk (monetary gamble with a sure loss vs. a loss with a given probability). Thirty participants were assigned to each experimental condition.
Participants in each condition were required to choose between a probabilistic outcome and a sure outcome in a series of 162 trials: On each trial, the fixed monetary amount for the probabilistic outcome (£680) was combined with one of nine probabilities (.01, .05, .10, .25, .50, .75, .90, .95, .99 ) and with one of the risks (judged as either high or low frequency in the norming procedure) or a monetary gamble, and each of these combinations was presented with one of 18 amounts for the sure outcomes (linearly spaced between £1 and £680), producing 1 ϫ 9 ϫ 18 ϭ 162 trials. The probability levels were presented in random order. As before, the CE of a prospect was estimated as the midpoint between the lowest accepted value and the highest rejected value.
Design and procedure. A 3 task (monetary-gamble risk, highfrequency insurance risk, low-frequency insurance risk) ϫ 9 probability levels (.01, .05, .10, .25, .50, .75, .90, .95, .99) design was used. Task was a between-groups variable, and probability was a within-groups variable. All nine probabilities were used in each of the three task conditions. However, to maximize any effect of accessibility on risk aversion, in the high-frequency insurance risk condition, we attached the highest probability levels to those risks judged as more frequent in the norming procedure, and in the low-frequency insurance risk condition, we attached the highest probability levels to those risks judged as less frequent in the norming procedure (see the Appendix).
At the start of the computer-controlled experimental session, task instructions and then an example scenario with illustrative choices were presented. On each trial, participants were asked to consider a presented scenario and choose one of two prospects, for example, (a) a 10% chance of theft of your laptop computer worth £680 or (b) buying insurance at a cost of £40 to insure against the theft of your laptop computer.
Participants completed a series of 162 trials, each consisting of binary decisions with one of the three types of scenario.
Results and Discussion
Risk preference. A plausible account for the difference between monetary gambles and precautionary decisions observed in our earlier experiments is that precautionary decisions invite respondents to refer to their experience and knowledge of the events referred to, whereas gambles do not. The results from Experiment 4 are consistent with this interpretation and, moreover, confirm our hypothesis regarding the differential accessibility of familiar risks (judged high frequency) and unfamiliar risks (judged low frequency)-risk aversion is greatest for the high-frequency decisions (59% overall), smaller for the lowfrequency decisions (40% overall), and least for the monetary gambles (32% overall; see Table 6 ).
As in Experiments 1, 2, and 3, participants' choices in the monetary-gamble risk and low-frequency risk conditions revealed a preponderance of risk-averse behavior for prospects with small probabilities (see Table 6 ) and risk-seeking preferences for prospects with medium and large probabilities. Decisions in the highfrequency condition were more risk averse for small and medium probabilities and, unlike the low-frequency and monetary-gamble conditions, were even predominantly risk averse for probabilities as high as 50% (see Table 6 ). In all three conditions, rates of risk-seeking choices increased with probability of risky prospects, but with even more risk seeking in the monetary-gamble and low-frequency risks scenarios than in the high-frequency risks scenarios, confirming the pattern of risk preferences found in Experiments 1 and 3. A 3 (high-frequency risk, low-frequency risk, monetary gamble) ϫ 9 (probability level) ANOVA confirmed these results: The main effects of risk scenario, F(8, 696) ϭ 44.40, p Ͻ .001, ε 2 ϭ .27, and probability level, F(2, 87) ϭ 20.62, p Ͻ .001, ε 2 ϭ .06, were significant. The interaction effect was not significant (F Ͻ 1). Multiple comparison tests with Bonferroni correction confirmed that risk-seeking preferences were significantly lower for high-frequency risks than for low-frequency risks and monetary-gamble risks (both p Ͻ .001), but there was no significant difference between low-frequency and monetarygamble risks ( p Ͼ .05). CE. As in Experiment 3, we analyzed the average level of participants' CE to investigate the need for theory to differentiate protective decision making from other types of decision making. For each respondent, the average CE estimation was based on 18 sure outcomes, each presented together with nine probabilistic outcomes. Consistent with the results for risk preferences, risk scenario had an effect on CE; participants' CE for high-frequency risks was higher (overall 0.46) than that for low-frequency risks (overall 0.39) and monetary gambles (overall 0.40), indicating a greater propensity for precautionary decisions for high-frequency risks. It is not surprising that CE increased with probability for all three types of risk (see Table 7 ). A 3 (high-frequency risk, lowfrequency risk, monetary gamble) ϫ 9 (probability level) ANOVA confirmed the significant main effects of risk scenario, F(8, 696) ϭ 267.00, p Ͻ .001, ε 2 ϭ .68, and probability level, F(2, 87) ϭ 4.64, p Ͻ .05, ε 2 ϭ .01, but the interaction effect was not significant (F Ͻ 1). Multiple comparison tests with Bonferroni corrections confirmed that CE was significantly higher for highfrequency risks than for low-frequency risks ( p Ͻ .05), and the difference between high-frequency risks and monetary-gamble risks was close to significance (.05 Ͻ p Ͻ .10), but there was no significant difference between low-frequency and monetarygamble risks ( p Ͼ .05).
Although there is no scope for any generic theory of risky choice to anticipate any difference between the responses given to low-and high-frequency risks when the supplied probabilities were matched, we did observe a difference: high-risk events evoked choices with higher CE than low-risk events. The most plausible basis for this discrepancy is the encoded frequency of these events in respondents' memory.
Inspection of Table 7 also indicates that the difference between the CEs for the low-and high-frequency risks increases as the probability of the risky prospect increases. Recall that in the choice task for the high-frequency insurance risk condition, we attached the highest probability levels to those risks judged as more frequent in the norming procedure; however, for the low-frequency insurance risk condition, we attached the highest probability levels to those risks judged as less frequent in the norming procedure. Accordingly, the increasing difference between the CEs for highand low-frequency events can be attributed to the influence of the accessibility of memory representations for these events-also responsible for the increasing difference in the judged frequency of those events. Consistent with this interpretation, the correlation between the difference in judged frequency for high-and lowfrequency events and the corresponding difference in CEs is positive and significant (r ϭ .88, p ϭ .002).
Probability-weighting function. We attempted to obtain fits of the probability-weighting function for individual participants but, presumably because of noise in responses, were unable to obtain good fits. To reduce noise, we attempted to fit the probabilityweighting function for triples of participants; respondent triples were formed on the basis of the similarity of participants' CEs. Ten triples were created for each of the three conditions. We fitted the functions for each triple and then analyzed the effect of the independent variables on the model parameters-in each case, minimizing the summed squared error between actual CEs and predicted CEs. As in the previous experiments, the model parameters were estimated on the basis of actual CEs, probabilities, and monetary amounts of the certain options. We fitted the probabilityweighting function successfully for eight of the 10 triples in each of the high-and low-frequency conditions (the other four triples showed an inconsistent pattern of CE across probability levels, i.e., CE was not a strictly increasing monotonic function of probability level) and for all participants in the monetary-gamble condition.
For monetary gambles and low-frequency insurance risks, the mean values (SDs) of attractiveness (␦) were less than 1: For monetary gambles, ␦ ϭ 0.77 (0.39), and for low-frequency insurance risks, ␦ ϭ 0.71 (0.68). By contrast, for the high-frequency insurance risks, the condition mean value (SD) for ␦ was 1.47 (0.70). The finding of a greater value for attractiveness in the high-frequency insurance condition indicates that respondents overweighted probabilities to a greater extent in that condition and is consistent with the notion that respondents show a protective effect for (i.e., exaggerate risk for) decisions about more accessible risks.
An ANOVA confirmed that the effect of task on attractiveness (␦) was significant, F(2, 23) ϭ 4.11, very large effect size (ε 2 ϭ .23), p Ͻ .05. Planned comparison tests with Bonferroni corrections showed that attractiveness (␦) for the insurance-loss condition with high-frequency risk was significantly larger than that for each of the other two conditions: t(23) ϭ 2.46, large effect size (r ϭ .46), p Ͻ .05, for gamble loss, and t(23) ϭ 2.54, large effect size (r ϭ .47), p Ͻ .05, for insurance with low-frequency risk. The model therefore exhibits a relationship between actual and 73 .122 .14 .251 .22 .432 .26 .549 .34 .581 .33 .651 .31 .749 .14 .388 .05 Overall .063 .06 .100 .20 .137 .12 .266 .20 .446 .22 .594 .29 .641 .26 .706 .22 .810 .10 .418 .06 Note. Range is a proportion of £680.
weighted probabilities-exaggerated risk-similar to that shown in Experiments 1, 2, and 3. Parameter values for the other variables (probability discriminability [␤] and utility [␣]) were more similar across tasks: For high-frequency risks, ␤ ϭ 0.80 (0.29), ␣ ϭ .98 (0.03); for lowfrequency insurance risk, ␤ ϭ 0.59 (0.36), ␣ ϭ 1.06 (0.16); and for monetary gambles, ␤ ϭ 0.67 (0.26), ␣ ϭ .99 (0.03). As in the previous experiments, the independent variables of task and domain did not affect the utility function parameter (␣) or probability discriminability (␤); an ANOVA showed no significant effect of task on the utility function parameter ␣, F(2, 23) ϭ 3.14, p Ͼ .05, or probability discriminability (␤), F(2, 23) ϭ 1.04, p Ͼ .05.
Together, the results from Experiment 4 suggest that participants' risky choices are influenced by the accessibility of events in memory even when these events are explicitly presented with probability information and the values of the possible outcomes. As with Experiments 1, 2, and 3, our results demonstrate the specificity of people's precautionary decisions: Contemplating different referents of the risky choice "p chance of x, otherwise y" leads to different preferences, which, given the observed pattern, we attribute to respondents' familiarity with the particular events being considered.
The similar CE and pattern of risk aversion for low-frequency risks and monetary gambles and their differentiation from the high-frequency risks corroborate our view that the differences observed between monetary gambles and insurance risks in the earlier experiments were caused by differences in the accessibility of these prospects.
Experiment 5
The memory-based account presented in this article assumes that the frequency of encounters with risky events in everyday life affects participants' preferences in characteristic ways not anticipated by most theories, which assume that all risky choices are equivalent to monetary gambles. Our account implies that, when making risky decisions, human preferences are affected by decision content-specifically the accessibility of events in memoryeven after outcome values and probabilities are known. We hypothesize that decisions about events rated as high frequency differ from decisions about events rated as low frequency and monetary gambles because the first cues accessible features in memory whereas the latter two do not.
Experiment 5 was designed to explore this issue further by investigating whether risky choices for the same events would vary systematically across respondents who had different perceptions of the frequency of those events. Studies have established that people in different countries have different views about the riskiness of various events (e.g., Teigen, Brun, & Slovic, 1988) . We investigated whether accessibility (measured by judged frequency) had a measurable impact on participants' risk preferences when we compared the risky choices made by participants from the United Kingdom and Japan, whom we expected to differ somewhat in their perceived frequency of some of the risky events. In particular, we predicted an association between differences in accessibility and resulting differences in the patterns of risky preferences across the two participant populations.
Method
Materials and apparatus. Materials and apparatus were the same as in Experiment 4, although all stimuli and instructions were translated into Japanese. On the basis of the norming procedure in Experiment 4, respondents were asked to rate each risk according to its frequency (participants were asked to refer to any instances of each risk that came to mind from any source of information) on a 10-point Likert scale ranging from not frequent to very frequent. Participants first judged the frequency of each of the presented risks, and then they were randomly assigned to one of the three experimental risky choice conditions. For the risky choices, monetary amounts were in Japanese yen (¥) and were equivalent in value to those used in Experiment 4.
Participants. Seventy-five University of Tokyo undergraduate and postgraduate students (49 male and 26 female) were recruited for a decision-making experiment. They were paid ¥700 and took part individually. Mean age was 20.67 (SD ϭ 3.11).
Results and Discussion
As we expected, the Japanese respondents judged the frequency of the risky events somewhat differently from how the UK respondents (in Experiment 4) judged the same events-in some cases, the differences were quite marked (see the Appendix). As we predicted, across events the differences between Japanese and UK (Experiment 4) respondents' mean judged frequency for each of the risky events corresponded to differences in their willingness to buy insurance for those events as measured by the CE measures used previously (r ϭ .62, p ϭ .006). A noteworthy aspect of this finding is that, unlike Experiment 4, which compared reactions to different high-and low-frequency risks, this experiment shows a difference in willingness to take risks for the same events as a function of differences in their perceived differential frequency. Consequently, the observed difference here cannot be attributed to any qualitative differences between the types of events.
As with the UK respondents in Experiment 4, for Japanese respondents the correlation (across nine levels of probability) between the difference in judged frequency for high-and lowfrequency events and the corresponding difference in CE is positive and significant (r ϭ .78, p Ͻ .05). This result replicates the finding that the frequency of events affects risky choices and further supports our claim that the accessibility of memory representations of events affects risky choices for these events.
Risk preference. For both low-frequency insurance risks and monetary gambles, more risk-seeking preferences were evident than for high-frequency insurance risks across most of the range of probabilities (see Table 8 ). The judged frequency of the four risks rated as highly frequent (above the midpoint of the scale) by both UK and Japanese participants in Experiments 4 and 5 (high-high risks) and their four counterparts rated as low frequency (below the midpoint of the scale) by both UK and Japanese participants (low-low risk) were analyzed for Japanese participants. A 3 (task: low-frequency insurance task, high-frequency insurance task, and monetary gamble) ϫ 4 (probability level: .05, .25, .50, and .99) ANOVA showed that the main effects of task, F(2, 72) ϭ 13.94, p Ͻ .001, ε 2 ϭ .07, and probability level, F(3, 216) ϭ 58.01, p Ͻ .001, ε 2 ϭ .33, on risk preference were significant. The interaction effect was not significant, F(3, 216) ϭ 1.06, p Ͼ .05. Multiple comparison tests with Bonferroni corrections confirmed that riskseeking preferences were significantly lower for high-frequency risks than for low-frequency risks ( p ϭ .001) and monetarygamble risks ( p Ͻ .001), but there was no significant difference between low-frequency and monetary-gamble risks ( p Ͼ .05).
We used hierarchical logistic regression analysis to investigate the effects of both judged risk frequency and supplied probability on risk preferences (0 ϭ risk seeking, 1 ϭ risk averse) in the insurance conditions over all presented risky events and all probability levels. Independent variables were judged event frequency (per participant) and supplied probability (.01, .05, .10, .25, .50, .75, .90, .95, and .99) , while controlling for the effect of participant (using criterion scaling; Pedhazur, 1997) . The effects of judged frequency, 2 (1) ϭ 31.88, odds ratio ϭ 3.58, p Ͻ .001, and probability, 2 (1) ϭ 23.11, odds ratio ϭ 0.009, p Ͻ .001, and the interaction effect, 2 (1) ϭ 3.84, odds ratio ϭ 0.58, p ϭ .05, were all statistically significant. The effects of judged frequency and probability confirm that both variables affect risky choice. Inspection of the interaction showed that judged frequency had a greater influence on decisions with lower probabilities, resulting in more risk aversion than for higher probabilities, although this may have been due to a ceiling effect; for high probabilities, participants were risk seeking close to 100% of the time. Further testing showed that the effect of judged frequency was significant both for probabilities below the median value (.50), 2 (1) ϭ 23.45, odds ratio ϭ 3.12, p Ͻ .001, and for probabilities above the median value, 2 (1) ϭ 30.42, odds ratio ϭ 2.15, p Ͻ .001.
CE. The judged frequency of the four risks rated as highly frequent in both Experiments 4 and 5 (high-high risks) and their counterparts (low-low risks) were analyzed. Analysis of the highfrequency insurance risks showed a higher CE than monetary gambles and low-frequency risks across the range of probabilities (see Table 9 ). A 3 (task: low-frequency insurance risk, highfrequency insurance risk, and monetary gamble) ϫ 4 (probability level: .05, .25, .50, and .99) ANOVA confirmed that the main effects of task, F(2, 72) ϭ 21.98, p Ͻ .001, ε 2 ϭ .03, and probability level, F(3, 216) ϭ 493.30, p Ͻ .001, ε 2 ϭ .80, were significant. The interaction effect was not significant, F(3, 216) ϭ 1.30, p Ͼ .05. Multiple comparison tests with Bonferroni correction confirmed that CE was significantly higher for high-frequency risks than for low-frequency risks and monetary-gamble risks (both p Ͻ .001), but there was no significant difference between low-frequency and monetary-gamble risks ( p Ͼ .05).
We used hierarchical multiple regression analysis to investigate the effects of both judged risk frequency and supplied probability on CE over all presented risks in the insurance conditions and all probability levels. Independent variables were judged risk frequency and probability (.01, .05, .10, .25, .50, .75, .09, .95, and .99) , while controlling for the effect of participant (using criterion scaling; Pedhazur, 1997) . The effects of judged frequency, Inspection of the interaction showed that, as with risk preferences, judged frequency had a greater influence on decisions with higher probabilities, resulting in even higher CEs than for lower probabilities. Further testing showed that the effect of judged frequency was significant for both probabilities below the median value (.50), t(197) ϭ 6.31, sr 2 ϭ .20, p Ͻ .001, and for probabilities above the median value, t(197) ϭ 10.10, sr 2 ϭ .35, p Ͻ .001. The effect of judged frequency from the norming procedure on CE and pattern of risk aversion are consistent with our view that the differences observed between monetary gambles and insurance risks in the earlier experiments were caused by differences in the accessibility of these prospects.
In summary, the results from Experiment 5 corroborate our earlier findings that decisions about subjectively more frequent events are different from those observed for equivalent choices between monetary gambles and judged low-frequency events. Japanese participants' risk judgments and corresponding preferences were different from those observed in the UK sample but nonetheless maintained the same relationship to each other and thereby confirmed our hypothesis regarding the impact of differential accessibility of risks on choice.
General Discussion
Our research demonstrates that risky decisions vary as a function of the events being considered even after all required probabilities and outcome values have been specified. In five experiments, we found and confirmed a protective effect-exemplified by exaggerated probability weights and greater risk aversion for precautionary decisions about more accessible (high-frequency) events compared to less accessible (low-frequency) events and monetary gambles. These findings establish that, contrary to the assumptions of normative theory and numerous descriptive theories of decision making under risk and uncertainty (e.g., Birnbaum, 2008; Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, & Hertwig, 2006; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947) , people's risk preferences and decisions under risk and uncertainty are not independent of problem content after all probabilities and outcome values are defined.
From the point of view of those theorists who assume that all risky decisions can be represented as monetary gambles, the results can be viewed as a demonstration of the failure of descriptive invariance-one of the axioms of expected utility theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984) . The descriptive invariance axiom states that equivalent formulations of a choice problem should give rise to the same preference order. However, we found that varying referent events with the same decision-making prospects led to different preference patterns.
Our result implies that the assumption that all decisions under risk or uncertainty can be effectively represented by monetary gambles requires some revision. Precautionary decisions can still, in a general sense, be viewed as gambles-but with the critical proviso that decision makers make different decisions when contemplating precautions than when contemplating gambles with identical values.
The finding that people's risk preferences cannot be accurately specified from studies of their reactions to monetary gambles raises both practical and theoretical questions. To the extent that there is no generally stable set of risk attitudes, then reliable predictions of risky decision making will not be possible across different decision-making domains. The experiments reported here found discrepancies between the risk attitudes for gambles and those for decisions regarding insurance against hazards-perhaps the most obvious practical application of risky decision making.
We found that the probability-weighting function exhibits properties for precautionary decisions different from those observed for putatively identical choices between gambles. People's protective willingness (greater risk aversion for precautionary decisions under risk) is indicated by increases in the probability-weighting estimates for low, moderate, and high probabilities of hazardous events. Overweighting of probability for precautionary decisions for moderate and high probabilities is a finding not anticipated by prospect theory or cumulative prospect theory-the most prominent descriptive theories for decisions under risk.
Our findings of exaggerated risk for small probabilities are also not anticipated by proponents of so-called experience-based decision making, who have argued that people underweight rather than overweight small probabilities when making decisions on the basis of their experience of risky events rather than summary descriptions of their likelihoods (Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2004) . In particular, experienced-based decision-making research has found that people's decisions about sequentially experienced events underweight low probability events (cf. Fox & Hadar, 2006; Jessup, Bishara, & Busemeyer, 2008; Newell & Rakow, 2007; Ungemach, Chater, & Stewart, 2009 ). Of course, our experiments were not specifically designed to investigate decisions based on experienced small probability events (we always supplied descriptions of the likelihood of events). Nonetheless, when decisions involved real-world events that could relate to and draw on our participants' experience, overweighting of probability (or risk aversion for negative events) was observed for small probabilities-even for those events participants rated as low-frequency experiences (Experiments 4 and 5).
The pattern of people's risk preferences found here is inconsistent with those found in previous descriptive studies. Early studies of utility commonly assumed that people's risk preferences are predominantly risk averse (Pratt, 1964) . However, risk seeking is also predictable under certain conditions. According to the wellknown fourfold pattern of risk attitudes established with gambles (Tversky & Fox, 1995; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) , people show risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses at high probability, and they show risk seeking for gains and risk aversion for losses at low probability. A similar prediction is made by Brandstätter et al. (2006) with their proposed priority heuristic, which produces a pattern of risk-averse and risk-seeking preferences based on rules (priority, stopping, and decision rules) consistent with the fourfold pattern found by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) ; see also Stewart et al. (2006) .
By contrast, we demonstrate that people's risk preferences can be risk averse for precautionary decisions about high-frequency events for almost the whole range of probability, and yet with monetary gambles in the domain of loss and for precautionary decisions involving low-frequency events, people are predominantly risk seeking. We find that, in precautionary decision mak-ing, more accessible events in memory have a greater influence on decisions than less accessible events (e.g., monetary gambles and less familiar real-world events). Experiments 4 and 5 produced evidence that the accessibility of hazardous events affects people's decisions: Instances of some protectable risks are judged to occur more frequently in everyday life than others, and the former risks produced a greater protective effect. The results of all five experiments demonstrated that people exaggerate described real-world risky prospects consistent with the assumption that precautionary decisions are dependent on the accessibility of hazardous events in memory.
The idea presented in this article that people's precautionary decisions might be affected by the accessibility of frequencies in memory is also supported by case-based decision theory (Gilboa & Schmeidler, 2001) , which assumes that decisions under uncertainty are made by analogy to previously encountered problems. The theory postulates a similarity function over decision problems and a utility function on outcomes, such that acts are evaluated by a similarity-weighted sum of the utility they yielded in past cases in which they were chosen.
The finding of Experiment 5 that Japanese decision makers, who differed from participants in the United Kingdom in their perception of the relative frequency of risky events and altered their choices accordingly, strongly suggests that a memory-based assessment of events informs risky decisions. The strong positive correlation between the differences in rated frequencies and the differences in risky choices for the same set of events is a clear indication that memorial representations of the frequency of events affected decisions made about them.
Such ideas could possibly account for our findings that people's risk preferences vary across specific decision-task domains, which, as we have argued, can be linked to the differential accessibility of the events under consideration. In contemplating most real-world risks, people suffer from a lack of knowledge about the probabilities of hazardous events (e.g., natural disaster, health, and safety risk). Where accessibility is a valid cue for likelihood then it should produce reasonably good decisions. However, problems arise when people have information about likelihood that is corrupted by the accessibility of events altering the impact of the probability information. One could view this as akin to the Stroop effect (Stroop, 1935) , where information in memory that conflicts with information present in the stimulus can disrupt decisions.
Other research has also shown differences in risky decisions as a function of decision content. Heath and Tversky (1991) found that decision makers under risk were sensitive to aspects of content independent of probability and utility information. In their studies, respondents exhibited a preference for betting on decisions about events on which they were knowledgeable rather than matched monetary gambles or events on which they were less knowledgeable. Although Heath and Tversky interpreted their result in terms of attributions for credit and blame, it could also be interpreted in terms of accessibility. Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001) also found evidence for effects of decision content on risky choice. They reported that the probability-weighting function may be influenced by affective reactions associated with potential outcomes of a risky prospect. As these authors pointed out, if the weight attached to an outcome depends on the nature of that outcome, then it is not possible to specify separate functions to describe the evaluation of outcomes and the evaluation of probabilities. Huber and Huber (2008) have argued that gambles are not good models for many real-life risky decisions because in real life, if decision makers realize that an otherwise attractive alternative may produce a negative outcome, they search for a risk-defusing operator (RDO) to eliminate or reduce the risk involved. In everyday risky decision situations, Huber and Huber claimed that RDOs are quite common. For example, people having to decide whether to travel to a region where infectious diseases are prevalent will inquire whether there is a vaccine against that disease instead of passively contemplating probabilities. A person wanting to buy a new car but uncertain whether she can meet the monthly installments may take out consumer credit repayment insurance. Huber (2007) claimed that in many real-life decisions-but not monetary gambles-many decision makers are not interested in probability information and instead actively search for RDOs. Evidence for the search for RDOs has been found in insurance decision making (Williamson, Ranyard, & Cuthbert, 2000) . However, it is not clear how RDOs could explain our finding that people are more risk averse for insurance than for gambles. According to Huber (2007) if a decision maker finds an RDO or an RDO is available, he or she chooses the risky alternative in question much more often than without finding an RDO. Although RDOs might be discovered in insurance scenarios, in choices among gambles (according to Huber, 2007) , except for choosing one alternative, the decision maker cannot exert any control at all. Moreover, it is clear that our respondents were influenced by probabilities.
One possible objection to the claims made here is that the risky insurance loss is, in fact, objectively worse than the risky monetary loss, because the insurance loss involves an additional hassle factor (e.g., being deprived of possessions one likes, needing to go out and buy replacements). To the extent that the risky insurance losses are indeed more negative than the corresponding risky monetary losses, one might argue that it is not surprising that participants are more risk averse in the insurance domain.
In our view, for both conceptual and empirical reasons, the notion that the insurance loss is objectively worse than the risky monetary loss cannot account for our results. For respondents in the insurance scenario, any envisaged additional hassle factor should not influence the insurance decision. Whether one is insured or not, loss of luggage implies that one has to suffer being deprived of possessions one likes and the inconvenience of having to go out and buy replacements-if one has the money to be able to afford to go and buy replacements, as in the insurance case one assuredly (literally) does. The point is that, in the insurance scenario, the option to buy insurance does not magic away any hassle or even reduce the likelihood of experiencing hassle (cf. Tykocinski, 2008) and, hence, does not justify greater risk aversion; indeed, one might even argue that there might be greater hassle in the insurance case if one buys insurance because here one has the additional hassle of making an insurance claim.
In any event, the idea that the insurance loss is objectively worse than the risky monetary loss was not a view held by our respondents because they were not, in terms of their willingness to suffer monetary losses to compensate them for loss of their luggage, risk averse for every level of probability of loss. As is shown in every experiment (e.g., see Figure 3d ), respondents in the insurance-loss condition were risk seeking at the highest level of probability of loss; had they valued loss of their luggage as worse than the loss of its corresponding expressed monetary value this would not have happened.
Moreover, the possibility that risky insurance loss is objectively worse than risky monetary loss is also excluded by another aspect of the results of Experiments 4 and 5. In both of these experiments, we report that, although risk-seeking preferences were significantly lower for high-frequency insurance risks than for lowfrequency insurance risks and monetary-gamble risks, there was no significant difference between low-frequency insurance risks and monetary-gamble risks; decisions were predominantly risk seeking for both sorts of risk-as predicted by cumulative prospect theory. Nevertheless, the low-frequency insurance risks would still entail hassles of the sort envisaged by this argument, and yet this does not appear to have been a factor for our respondents when considering such risks as damage to accommodation by burst pipes, damage to laptop computers by fire (caused by a technical problem), or damage to gardens by falling trees. Although these hazards would undoubtedly involve hassle for a victim of these misfortunes, as we have explained, the hassle would be present regardless of one's decision to insure.
The effects we attribute to the accessibility of risky events should be tested further in future studies. For instance, one obvious next step is to see whether the effects can be measured when the accessibility of probability information is manipulated independently of subjective frequency beliefs. One possible way to achieve this, suggested to us by an anonymous reviewer of this article, would be to develop a priming paradigm.
In summary, the evidence presented in this article calls into question the assumption that decisions made with monetary gambles can be used as a methodology for evaluating domain-independent risk preferences. We suggest that this, in turn, should prompt further exploration of how what it is that people are deciding about produces variation in the risks people are prepared to take.
Over the years, several authors have commented on the preeminence of monetary gambles in studies of risky choice. For example, Lopes (1983) commented that "the simple static lottery or gamble is as indispensable to research on risk as is the fruitfly to genetics" (p. 173). Goldstein and Weber (1997) , in a similar comparative vein, argued that "simple gambles are as prevalent in decision research as nonsense syllables ever were in memory research" (p. 92).
It is understandable why researchers have found monetary gambles an attractive research vehicle. As Goldstein and Weber (1997) made clear, it seems a poor trade to exchange familiar content free taxonomies of decision problems (e.g. decision making under risk, uncertainty and certainty) for an explosion of content-specific categories of decisions (e.g. career decisions; housing decisions; animal, mineral and vegetable decisions etc.), each of which may require a different theory. (p. 84) As these authors argued, one can also be tempted to believe that in studying reactions to monetary gambles, one is studying risky decision making in its most essential form, permitting the widest possible generalizability. Although some take it as a basic premise that "most decisions in life are gambles" (Fox & See, 2003, p. 273) , our research indicates that for some decisions, this attractive metaphor may be misleading. Credit 
